Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

John Carl Putvin v. Karen Larie Thompson, Joseph
Blaine Thompson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel Darger; Attorney for Appellant.
Mitchell R. Barker; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, John Carl Putvin v. Karen Larie Thompson, Joseph Blaine Thompson, No. 930359 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5272

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UlMn w u u m wr H r r c n t g

BRIEF
ITAH
DCOUViENT
K. U
51
m THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

Case No: 930359-CA

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON
Priority No: 4
Defendant and Appellant

REPLY

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Mitchell R. Barker
349 South 200 East #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Daniel Darger
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place

Attorney for Appellee

Telephone 801-53 l-66£^h court of Appeals

Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 f^|LED
Attorney for Appellant

HAR 3 1 1994
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J-

MaryT.Noonan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES"

1

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF
PROCEEDING

1

ARGUMENT

1

CONCLUSION

10

\
\

f

/
\
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987)

6

Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 309 [Utah 1979]

2

Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990]

2

Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987)

6

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989)

1

Rules
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 33

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59

2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

10

- ii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff and Appellee

vs.

Case No: 930359-CA

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
JOSEPH BLAINE THOMPSON
Priority No: 4
Defendant and Appellant

REPLY

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Mitchell R. Barker
349 South 200 East #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

Daniel Darger
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Telephone 801-531-6686
Attorney for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF ISSUES"
As noted in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512
(1989), it is the province of the Appellant to frame the issues on appeal, for "the party who
brings a suit [or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . . " Appellant's
"Statement of Issues" bears little resemblance to the issues raised by Appellant and appears
to be an attempt at cross-appeal. The statement should be ignored.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" AND "COURSE OF
PROCEEDINGS"
Appellee is correct at Br. 1 in stating that this is an appeal from the denial of a
motion by Appellant seeking to set a custody decree aside. However, the remainder is little
more than argument, based upon misstatements of fact and fabrication, and should be
disregarded.
ARGUMENT
Appellee raises 25 points of argument in his response brief, many of them redundant.
Points 2., 3., 4., 10., 20., and 21. all involve Appellee's claim that this appeal was not
timely filed. These are the same issues that were raised and briefed in Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction and require no further reply except to point out that
Appellee continues to make arguments in his brief that were not warranted by law and were
frivolous when made in his motion to dismiss. However, he now has the benefit of
Appellant's reply to his motion, and if he didn't know the law then, he sure did when he
prepared his response brief.
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Point 9. also appears to be an attack on the timeliness of appeal not raised in
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. Appellee seems to be arguing that Mr. Kimball's affidavit
and testimony is not newly discovered evidence and therefore the Rule 59 Motion to Alter or
Amend was not effective in tolling the time for appeal.
He cites no law for this proposition and totally ignores the case law readily available
in the annotations to this rule. All hold that a timely motion under Rule 59 U.R.C.P.
terminates the running of the time for appeal, and time does not begin to run again until the
order granting or denying such order is entered, (e.g. Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d
309 [Utah 1979]; Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 [Utah Ct. App, 1990])
Not a single Utah case holds that the time for appeal is tolled only if the trial court
finds that the Rule 59 motion is well taken, as Appellee suggests (Appellee Br. pp. 26, 27).
Such an interpretation would place counsel at risk of malpractice every time a Rule 59
motion was filed unless notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the original judgment
regardless of the outcome of the motion. This argument is frivolous.
At Point 6. (Appellee Br. p. 22), Appellee argues that Appellant is barred by the "law
of the case" from the relief sought herein. No cases are cited or evidence marshalled as to
how the law of the case applies. Instead, Appellee cites cases holding that a party must
show a "substantial change of material circumstances" before a decree can be modified.
Appellee ignores the fact that this is not an attempt to modify the decree and the cases cited
by Appellee are totally irrelevant.
Appellee argues at Point 7. (Appellee Br. p. 22) that Appellant had a chance to
/

protect herself (presumably from Mr. Kimball's conduct) during the trial of this case and that
/

(

I
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she failed to do so by failing to call Mr. Kimball as a witness. Further, he argues at Point
23 (Appellee Br. 43) that deference should be accorded the trial judge on this issue (of
awarding custody).
Ignored is the fact that the "trial" was actually an evidentiary hearing solely on the
issue of modifying visitation from supervised to unsupervised. Other issues were not before
the trial court and not relevant. Further, as pointed out below, the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are so insufficient that one is unable to determine why the trial court
awarded custody to Appellee. So how can this unknown determination be given deference?
This argument is without merit.
At Paragraph 8. (Appellee Br. p.25) the laches argument is made. Appellee argues
that Appellant's "delay" in pursuing an order setting the decree aside was unreasonable.
However, the record shows no delay. For upon retaining new counsel on May 4, 1992,
(Attachment A of Appellant's Brief), a motion to set the decree aside was prepared and filed
on May 26, 1992.(Rec. 658-704, 707-708) Further, as set out below, she did not learn that
a default decree had been entered until the end of January, 1992, at which time she was
again relying upon Mr. Kimball.
Appellee's claim that the delay between filing the motion to set aside and the courts
eventual ruling should be attributed to Appellant, is like the pot calling the kettle black..
(Appellee Br. p. 26) Appellant has no control over the trial court's schedule. She filed a
timely notice to submit her motion for decision on June 16, 1992 (Rec. 745) And on June
17, 1992, Appellee filed an objection to the notice to submit, arguing that the court had
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previously determined that Appellant's motion to modify the visitation provisions should be
resolved before the court acted upon the motion to set it aside. (Rec. 747-748)
And, several days later, Appellee got around to filing a response to the motion to set
aside (Rec. 749-759); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the objection and responsive
brief (Rec. 761-768); followed by Appellee's Amended Response to Motion to Set Aside
(Rec.814-824); followed by Appellant's motion to strike the amended response. (Rec. 825826) (The memo in support of this motion does not appear in the record for some reason and
is attached hereto as Attachment A)
A cursory examination of the above documents will reveal that it was Appellee who
was trying to delay the trial court's ruling on the motion to set aside, not Appellant. Further,
this examination will reveal a pattern followed by Appellee throughout this entire litigation of
ignoring the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and twisting facts to meet his purposes. (Not to
mention the impropriety of Attachment C of Appellee's Brief) And, Appellee is clearly
trying to mislead this court as well.
Points 1., 5., 15., 16., and 17. of Appellee's brief are all based upon a claim that
Appellant's answer was withdrawn and the default decree entered against her as a result of
her stipulation that it be done. Appellee's proof of a stipulation consists of Appellant's
infamous letter of November 4, 1991 (Rec. 410-413; Appendix A of Appellee's Brief) and
Mr. Kimball's signature approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree.
However, a review of the November 4th letter indicates absolutely no basis for the
misdeeds perpetrated upon Appellant on November 12th and 13th of 1991. And when
reviewed together with the affidavit of Mr. Kimball (Rec. 1380-1383) as well as the
/
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testimony of the parties set out below, it is clear that there was no meeting of the minds, no
knowing waiver of rights, and no authority for Mr. Kimball to do what he did. Finally, the
trial court's minute entry of November 12, 1991 (Rec. 414) indicates on its face that the
custody arrangement discussed in the telephonic scheduling conference was a temporary
arrangement indicating that it was "until such time the Defendant has resolved her problem."
(Rec. 414)
Attempts by Appellee, and the trial court, to justify what occurred the following day
on the basis of the November 4th letter is horribly misplaced. For this letter was intended as
a personal communication to Appellee, the father of Appellant's only child, not for the
benefit of the attorney's or the court! (Rec. 2175) Appellant's expressions of frustration and
resignation made in a personal letter to Appellee hardly rise to the level of a stipulation or a
settlement agreement. Instead, this letter reflects Appellant's repeated refusal to sign off on
Appellee's settlement demands and states "I am not giving up and neither is my family."
(Rec. 411) Yet, seven days later, Appellee managed to twist this personal letter into a
stipulation for withdrawing Appellant's answer and counterclaim, and entering a default
decree against her while Mr. Kimball stood lamely by. (Appellee Br. p.35: "This letter
constitutes a default") This is hardly justice.
Appellee argues at Points 11. and 12. that the Findings supporting the award of
custody were adequate because (1) custody was not at issue (Appellee Br. p. 28, 29) and, (2)
adequate findings were incorporated by reference in the form of the so-called custody

j

evaluation of Patricia Smith, Phd. (Appellee Br. p. 29-34) However, regardless of the
number of facts Appellee incorporated into the findings and conclusions by reference, they
(

\
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have a fatal flaw in that they never explain why the trial court felt one parent better than the
other. They simply fail to articulate a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision by
reference to pertinent factors that relate to the best interests of the child. Sanderson v.
Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987)
Appellee cites the case of Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987)
[Specific findings are not required where custody is not an issue.] in support of his
contention that the findings were adequate in the instant case. He argues that custody was
not an issue in the instant case because it had been resolved by the supposed "stipulation"
(the November 4th letter and Mr. Kimball's agreement to the findings)k
However, the Ebbert case is not applicable because custody was, and is, the only
issue, and hotly contested in the instant case. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim
seeking custody (Rec. 299-302) And just prior to the entry of the default decree, she was
resisting attempts by Appellee and Mr. Kimball to get her to sign stipulations giving
Appellee custody. (Rec. 2169)

As Appellee's attorney, Mr. Barker stated:

...it's been broached the fact that there's been several attempts at stipulation, and
none of them included supervised visitation. Lest the court be misled into thinking
it's (supervised visitation) some kind of a punishment later, we need to establish
through these documents that she refused to even sign the very most basic two
paragraph stipulation. She wouldn't put her signature on anything. (Rec. 2066-2068)
And Appellee testified:

(

/

[Exhibit] thirteen is the settlement stipulation, a final settlement stipulation with my
signature on it, dated the 5th day of November, 1991, (8 days before the default
decree was entered) which was the product of five successive weeks of weekly
meetings between myself, yourself, Chase Kimball, attorney for Karen Thompson,
Karen Thompson, and Deborah's guardian ad litem, Arnold Gardner; and also
countersigned by the custody evaluator, Patricia Smith. (Emphasis added)

/

/

Q.

And the shorter one, the second one, which would be thirteen, I guess?
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A.
Yes. It's a two paragraph stipulation, merely saying that John Putvin shall
receive sole permanent custody; Karen shall receive minimum standard visitation.
(Rec. 2067-2068)
* * *

Q.
(By Mr. Barker)
Mr. Putvin, those stipulations and the unwillingness to
sign them on Karen's part, why does that have anything to do with your concern that
there's a flight risk, and there should be supervised visitation?
A.
Well, first, in her deposition as has been entered in this record, she refused to
hypothetically agree to some stipulation that if one party moved, the other would get
custody. There was a great deal of ovation on that. Secondly, in this document it
stipulates that either party, a physical move by either party would be considered a
material change of circumstance, which would warrant a review of the custody
arrangement. And she refused to sign that.[No kidding!] (Emphasis and editorial
added)
* * *

Q.
With regard to those stipulations, what should make Judge Hanson believe if
anything that that concern is still real, there's still a concern that her refusal to sign
those stipulations, or other activities in relation to the court indicate there's still a
risk?
A.
She sent me, personally addressed to me, her November 4th letter, and in that
she says I'm not giving up the fight, but I'm not going to fight the devil, ie, you.
(Rec. 2069-2070) (Emphasis added)
Appellee has also testified as to the vehemence with which Appellant contested
custody, stating "...she's contested my name on the birth certificate, and Deborah's middle
name, and has opposed vehemently any effort on my part to have that corrected." (Rec.
2064)
Appellant's uncontroverted testimony is: "Because Chase [Kimball] was insisting that
I sign those other documents. As a matter of fact, he threatened me over the phone. And I
could not accept the way he was going on it." (Rec. 2175)

'

(
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In response to Mr. Barker's question:
Now you have made some pretty serious accusations against Chase Kimball. Can you
tell us what threat he made to you to get you to sign? He threatened you to try to get
you to sign a stipulation, is that what you said?
she testified:
He was yelling at me in a very loud, and screaming voice over the phone, and he
says, you had better sign that. He says you better call me back within five minutes
with the answer to sign this, or you will loose your daughter, and you will be very,
very, very sorry. And he kept saying that over and over, and was very, very
threatening in his demeanor. (Rec. 2179)
Approximately one week later, Mr. Kimball made good his threat.
Thus, it is obvious that immediately prior to the supposed settlement which Appellee
claims made custody a non-issue, Appellant was adamantly refusing to settle or stipulate
away her claim to custody in spite of the threats of her own attorney! Thereafter, Appellee
used the November 4th letter and the complicity of Appellant's counsel to not only obtain
permanent custody, but an onerous visitation arrangement which effectively cut Appellant off
from any meaningful relationship with her daughter. (The quote of Judge Hanson at
Appellee Brf. p.23 is enlightening on how this was accomplished.)

And, shortly thereafter,

Appellee and the child moved to New Zealand.
The above testimony is also enlightening as to the argument made by Appellee at
Point 18. and 24. For, as Appellee admits at Brief 40-41, in January, 1992, when Mr.
Kimball attempted to act on Appellant's behalf in this action, Appellee filed a Motion to
Require Proof of Authority (Rec. 506-507) The obvious inference is that Appellee had
reason to believe Mr. Kimball had been discharged from the case.

/
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Mr. Kimball's affidavit in response to this motion (Rec. 499-500) does imply that his
representation of Appellant had been continuous and unbroken up to that date and to this
extent, is inconsistent with his later affidavit in support of the motion to amend. (Rec. 13801383) However, this later affidavit is clearly against Mr. Kimball's interest in that it exposes
him to civil suit for malpractice as well as professional disciplinary action.
More importantly it corroborates the inference that Appellee knew of his lack of
authority and provides a timeframe wherein Appellee obtained this knowledge (Before
Kimball approved the findings and decree). He had absolutely nothing to gain and
everything to lose in giving this affidavit and its credibility should be given great weight.
Appellee's argument, that Mr. Kimball did represent Appellant at the time the decree
was entered, misses the point. Whether he did or didn't, it is uncontroverted that he was not
authorized by his client to withdraw her answer and counterclaim, enter into a stipulation on
her behalf, approve findings of fact, conclusions of law or the entry of a default decree. In
fact, he was specifically directed otherwise by his client.
The uncontroverted testimony of Appellant is as follows:
Q.

When was the first time you saw that custody decree?

A.
If I've seen it, I think I have, if I've seen it, it was I went with you to the
courthouse.
Q.

When was the first time you ever became aware of the custody decree?

A.
I believe it was toward the end of January, and I don't even remember how I
found out, but I was very upset, and I called Chase, and raked him over the coals for
it.
Q.

Did you ever authorize Mr. Kimball to withdraw your answer?

A.

Did I ever authorize?
9
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r

Q.

To withdraw your answer to this lawsuit, and let it go by default?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.
Did you ever authorize him to approve, or sign the Findings of Fact or that
default decree?
A.
Absolutely not. In the first place, I didn't know there was a default decree
going on. In the second place, he wanted me to sign one of these other things, and
when I refused, he said, well then let me sign it. I said, absolutely not. If anybody
signs it, it will be me, and you're not. (Rec.2170-2171)
In any event, it is manifestly unjust to sanction Appellant for Mr. Kimball's duplicity
and abandonment, or for bringing it to the trial court's attention.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious from the record that Appellant was unjustly denied a fair hearing on her
claim to custody of her child. Instead, the misdeeds of Appellee and Appellant's attorney,
Mr. Kimball, resulted in a default decree of custody which allowed Appellee and his other
wife, to whisk the child away to New Zealand. Since that time, Appellant has had to swim
up the stream of Appellee's numerous and meritless, motions, petitions, personal injury
actions and all else that a bottomless pocket and a willing attorney can devise to vex her.
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and
remand this matter for a hearing on the issue of custody. Further, Appellant should be
awarded attorney's fees for proceedings in the trial court and on appeal, pursuant to Rule 33,

/

/
/
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U.R.A.P. and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. for the numerous frivolous pleadings filed by Appellant
since May, 1992.

DATED this

2£& day of
DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant has been hand delivered to Mitchell R. Barker, 349 South 200 East, Suite 170,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this 3 D day of . \pM^M. , 1994.
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A

Daniel Darger (0815)
Attorney at Law
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN

:

Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STRIKE

vs.
CivifNo: 910903188 CS
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL

:

Defendant

:

Judge: Hanson

COMES NOW, Plaintiff by and through her attorney Daniel Darger, Esq., and hereby
submits the above-entitled Memorandum.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

On May 26, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel a motion and

memorandum to set aside the default custody decree entered in this matter. (Exhibit A)
2.

On June 2, 1992, Defendant served upon Plaintiffs counsel an addendum to

Defendant's memorandum in support of said motion. (Exhibit B)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

On June 16, Plaintiff had failed to file a responsive memorandum and on said

date, Plaintiff filed a notice to submit. (Exhibit C)
4.

On June 17, 1992, Plaintiff filed an objection to the notice to submit. (Exhibit

5.

On June 18, 1992, Plaintiff mailed to Defendant a response memorandum to

D)

Plaintiffs motion to set aside. (Exhibit E)
6.

This Court has entered no order extending Plaintiffs time to respond nor has it

entered an order staying the determination of Defendant's motion or otherwise delaying the
decision on Plaintiffs motion.
7.

On June 26, Defendant received Plaintiffs Amended Response (Exhibit F)
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM IS UNTIMELY

AND SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Rule 4-501 is clear in its requirement that a responsive pleading shall be filed and
served within ten days after service. The use of the mandatory word "shall" indicates that
strict compliance is required. Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2nd 204 (Utah App. 1988)
(Mandatory requirements must be complied with precisely)
The appellate courts of Utah have consistently held that the procedural time
requirements must be strictly complied with, unless a motion to extend the time is timely
made, or upon motion and a showing of excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P.
The cites to these decisions are too numerous to include herewith considering the number of
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different rules to which they relate; e.g. Rule 12 (answer), rule 52 and 59 (motion for new
trial), appellate Rule 4, etc.
While the appellate courts in Utah have yet to rule on directly on this issue, the Court
of Appeals has indicated in dicta that a responsive memorandum must be timely for it to be
considered in ruling on a motion. In the case of Gillmore v. Cummings, 806 P.2nd 1205
(Utah App 1991), the court reversed an order of summary judgment because it was entered
prior to the expiration of the ten day period for filing a responsive memorandum. The court
stated: "...the trial court should have considered such a response, if timely received, before
ruling on the motion to strike and the summary judgment motion." (emphasis added, at page
1208)
Plaintiff was served with Defendant's motion on May 26, 1992 and the response
would have been due on June 8th, with the three day mailing period included. Defendant
served her addendum on Plaintiff on June 2, 1992 and Plaintiff waited an additional thirteen
days after this date to file the notice to submit. Thus, Plaintiff had at least twenty one days
in which to prepare a response, which he failed to do. Thus, the filing of an amended
responsive memorandum thereafter, is untimely and this court should strike this pleading as
not complying with Rule 4-501.
The alleged basis for Plaintiffs objection and the late filing of his memorandum and
amendment should be of substantial concern to this court. As the Court will recall, it noted
Defendant's motion to set aside while in chambers prior to the beginning of the evidentiary
hearing on Defendant's motion to modify visitation, he Court commented that a decision of
the motion to set aside may make the evidentiary hearing moot. However, Plaintiff states in
J

i
\

3
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his objection that this Court "stated that Defendant's earlier motion, to modify the visitation
provisions of the decree, should be determined before the instant motion is considered."
(Exhibit D) And in his memorandum, Plaintiff argues that his responsive memorandum is not
yet due because the courts comment referred to above somehow had the effect of staying
Defendant's motion to set aside, or tolling or extending the time within which Plaintiff is
required to answer. As this court is aware, Plaintiffs position has absolutely no basis in fact
or law.
To begin with, it defies logic and reason as to why this court would stay the decision
on a motion that may make a prior motion moot until the prior motion can be decided. If
anything, reason would dictate that it be the other way around. More importantly, this Court
entered no such order and no motion for such an order has been filed. Assuming the fact that
Plaintiffs counsel is a licensed member of the Bar, he is presumed to know that the alteration
•4

of time requirements set by procedural rules can only be done upon stipulation or motion
properly brought before the court, and not by the courts spontaneous comment in chambers.
If he is not so aware, Rule 11 would require that he make inquiry. Instead of filing a Rule
6(b) motion, and providing a showing of excusable neglect, Plaintiff simply ignores the law
and files his memorandum.
Of equal concern is Plaintiffs outright misrepresentation of the facts. The comment
in chambers as recalled by this counsel was not as Plaintiff represents. However, Defendant
will leave it to the court to construe its own comments. Suffice it to say that this does not
amount to excusable neglect where, subsequent to the comment in chambers, Plaintiff was
served with

V
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Defendant's addendum to the memorandum, clearly indicating that Defendant had no illusions
that her motion to set aside was not proceeding forward.
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court disregard
Plaintiffs amended memorandum in ruling upon Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default
decree. Further, this court should strike said pleadings from the record as untimely.

Dated th

feP^ day of /fl/14
DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of "(he foregoing Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Strike has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870
South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692. this~2.U dav of^Ofr-*—
,
1992.
• ^ ^ s A l ^f>

v
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Daniel Darger (0815)

Attorney at Law
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SET ASID:
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
>f-f*

vs.
Civil No: 910903188 CS
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL
Defendant

JuGsc: Hanson

Motion is hereby made for an order setting aside the default custody decree entered in
the above matter by this Court on November 13, 1991. Tnis motion is made pursuant to Rule
60 (b) (5) in that said judgment is void to the extent that it provides relief different in kind
from or exceeding that specifically prayed for in plaintiffs complaint or to the extent that
said decree goes beyond the actual decision of this Court.
/
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Furthcr, this motion is made pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (7) in that said decree is

"improper, or illegal, and voidable." ( P & B Land. Inc. v. Klungervik. 751 P.2nd 274 [UL CL
App. 1988] at page 277)
Basis for this motion is more particularly set out in defendant's memorandum in
support hereof, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

Dated thiSeCZfe? day of

fv

, 1992.

/ V h^S, €ci>
C\-jr^
Daniel Darker
Attorney ai Law
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE*
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 2 true and correct copy of the foregoing Morion has been
mailed, post2ne prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2S70 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT
84115-3692, t h i s T U day of TVSH U
1992.

A]
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T I M i n»j i r ^ j : g irtiT**•« 5. J

For the reasons above stated, defendant respectfully

the Findings of Fact, Concl

Duted this J2J^'

requests that this Court set aside

usions of Law and Custody Decree previously entered.

1A
m d a y of

"]{/[f,^

., 1992

DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barkcr.2870 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, UT 84115-3692, this O i l * day of t W ) ! A
. 1992.

G10mot.pri
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Daniel Darper (0815) •*'•'"'*
Attorney at Law

](K) Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CARL PUTVIN
ADDENDUM TO DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, ET AL
Civil Net 9.10903188 CS
Defendant
Judce: Hanson

COMES NOW, Defendant by and through her attorney Daniel Darger. Esq., and
hereby submits the above-entitled Memorandum.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the facts set forth in her

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on file herein.

1
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A mere finding that the panics air
awarded the care, custody and control" of
custody award is challenged and an abuse
appeal. (Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2nd

or arc not "fit and proper persons to be
the child cannot pass muster when the
of the trial court's discretion is urged on
994 [Utah 1986] at page 994.)

This exactly the instant case. The findings merely recite that Plaintiff is a fit and
proper person to be awarded custody. There is no finding as to what would be in the best
interest of Deborah.

And, in facL this coun could not make the required findings based upon

the evidentiary record as it is. Tnere has been no evidentiary hearing to allow the coun to
hear and weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, nor is there a stipulation signed
by the parties as to what those facts are. Since the custody issue was not tried upon the facts,
there is simply no evidence for the court to sift in determining the best interests of Deborah
and, thus, the findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous.
For the additional reasons above stated. Defendant respectfully request that this Court
set aside the findings of faci conclusions of law and custody decree heretofore entered.
Dated this

'

C2V 01

iu.v~

/ I,,

C^

19992.

/

CPrc^
DANIEL DARGER
Auomtv for Plaintiff

T

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
has been mailed. postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker.2870 South Stats Street. Salt Lake
City. UT 84115-3692. this ' £ •
day of - Z T w » ^
. 1992.

•J -
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Daniel Dargcr (0815)
Attorney for Defendant
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6686
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CARL PUTVLN
NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No: 910903188 CS

KAREN LARIE THOMPSON
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant

TO THE CLERK OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, pursuant to Rule 4-501 (l)(d) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, that all papers to be filed in support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment have been filed, and Defendant reauesis that this be submitted for decision.
DATED this 1 U

day of

^ *>>> >

199JL
DANIEL DARGER
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY thai a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Mitchell R. Barker, 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah 841 ] £ this WJ> day of "5"^-^-^, 1992.

\V^ s^)^-/„-
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4 530
Attorney for Defendant
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LATE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
NOTICE TO SUBMIT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910903188CS
vs.
<AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,

Judge Hanson
. * < . •>

Defendants.

Plaintiff

John

Carl

Putvin

("John"")

comes

now

and

respectfully objects to the "Notice to Submit" filed by defendant
Karen Thompson ("Karen") on or about June 16, 1992. The Notice is
premature and contrary to the direction given by the Court.
Defendant herself has filed a Petition to Change Custody in
the action, which is still pending.

An evidentiary hearing was

held on that motion on Kay 27 and 28, 1992. The third day of the
hearing on her motion is scheduled for July 7, 1992.
/

At the two day hearing, the Court acknowledged defendant's

motion attacking the original decree, and stated that defendant's
earlier motion, to modify the visitation provisions of the decree,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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should be determined before the instant motion is considered.
For some reason Plaintiff's counsel has no copy of defendant's
memorandum in its files. On this date the undersigned has obtained
a copy of the memorandum from the office of defense counsel.

In

the event the Court desires briefing of the matter now, the
plaintiff should be permitted an opportunity to brief this very
serious matter prior to submission for decision.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of June, 1992.

Kitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed to Daniel Darger, Esq., on this 17th day of June, 1992, at
100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111.

KiuCheil R. Barker

l
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Mitchell R. Barker, #453 0
Attorney for Defendant
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3 692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910903188CS
vs.
Judge Hanson

<AREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

.* .*..

Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson").

INTRODUCTION
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to them, and then
approved them by his signature.

Even if her ninety day period
(

within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the
judgment had

not already passed, her actions and those of her

attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed.
1
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Decree.

What she really seeks is a modification of the decree,

without following Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without
showing changed circumstances and without following the clear
procedural requirements and pre-conditions contained in the Decree.
Par.

5.

Since Thompson failed to appeal, she must move against

the Decree by way of a petition to modify, showing
circumstances. Anderson

changed

v. Anderson, 12 Utah 2d. 36, 3 68 P. 2d 264

(1962) .
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1952.

Mitchell R. .Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June,
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100
Commercial Club Building, 3 2 Exchanae Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.

Mitchell R. Barker

11
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Mitchell R. Barker, #4530
Attorney for Defendant
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9638
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

JOHN CARL PUTVIN,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910903188CS
vs.
Judge Hanson

CAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

.*

Plaintiff John Carl Putvin ("Putvin") comes now and responds
as follows to the "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" filed by
defendant Karen Thompson ("Thompson").
INTRODUCTION
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered
by the Court only after defense counsel agreed to themf and then
approved them by his signature.

Even if her ninety day period

within which to ask the Court to consider setting aside the
judgment had

not already passed, her actions and those of her

attorney waived any defect she might have otherwise claimed.
/
/

This response memorandum is actually not yet due. During the
1
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entered upon the minutes of the court."
Sec.

2 (1974)

73 Am.Jur2d

Stipulations

(footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with

approval in Barker

v. Brown,

744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987).
CONCLUSION

Thompson has no basis for relief from her voluntarily entered
Decree. What she really seeks is a modification, without following
Rule 6-404, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., without showing changed
circumstances and without following the clear procedure and preconditions in the Decree. Par.

5.

Since Thompson failed to

appeal, she must move against the Decree by way of a petition to
modify, showing changed circumstances.
Utah 2d. 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962).

Anderson

v. Anderson,

12

Yet she argues as if on appeal.

Respectfully submitted this 18th day of June, 1992.

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on or about this eighteenth day of June,
1992, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Daniel Darger, Esq., 100
Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.
I

Mitchell R. Barker
4
11
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he hail purchased the panties worn by E. in
the picture. Mrs. Workman corroborated,
l e n l i f y i i i g thut s h e ili«l n o l rcmeiiihcr

the

picture being La ken and that she had never
seen the picture or the panties before. Mr.
Workman testified thai he could not remember the picture being taken. Even
though defendants knew that Kelly had
behaved inappropriately with E., much of
the ioappropiiate behavior that they knew
about occurred in 1987 and 1988 and the
photograph was taken hi 1986. Moreover,
any knowledge of inappropriate behavior
does not go to whether they knew the
photo was being taken, nor at what angle
and foeii*. Further, while Kelly did testify
to sexually abutting E., he never testified to
being sexually aroused by the photo hi
question nor of taking or possessing it for
the purpose of being aroused, nor of telling
defendants that the photo aroused hhu.
In short, no evidence supports a conclusion that defendants knew that E.'s buttocks were only partially covered moments
before the photo was taken, that they
knowingly allowed Kelly to take or possess
the photo, or thnt they knew the photo was
taken or possessed by Kelly for the purpose of sexually arousing him. The State
therefore failed to present any evidence on
the intent element of the offense chare., d
Thus, the judge was justified in arresting
the judgment on the basis that the facts
proved did not constitute an offense.
OUSTHUCTJON OF JUSTICE
| 5 | The State charged Mrs. Wotkman
with obstruction of justice in violation of
Utah Code Ann | 10 8 306 4 The reipii
site criminal intent Is "with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a
crime
"
4.

Tlir Information thaiglng Mrs. Workman with
viol.itinit of Utah CoJc Ann. f H I 306 charges
as follmvs:
lh.»t on or about Sc|>lcml>cr. I°*$ to August.
I9S9. al the place aforesaid 11.4)Ion), the defendants. »s parties, with Intent lu himler.
preterit, or del.*)' the ilixovciy, apprehension,
prosecution, convktlun or punishment of an-

Again, where either a trial or an appellate court, substitutes its judgment for that
of the jury, the verdict must be based on
evidence "so inherently Improbable that no
reasonable mind could believe it." State v.
Myers, COG l\2tl 260, 2n3 (Utah 19811) (Wil
kins, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Under such circumstances, an arrest of judgment is appropriate.
The Stale claims that Mrs. Workman obstructed justice because she knew that Kelly was sexually abusing and exploiting E.
and she deliberately withheld this information from the police until after they contacted her. The specific evidence relied on
by the State Is Mrs. Workman's knowledge
that Kelly sent bras to K. in late 1987 or
early 1088, her receipt of the telephone call
about the pool incident in the summer of
1988, Kelly's statement that he wanted to
marry E. made in 1087, ami the pcijod of
daily long distance telephone CHIIS for
which there is no date. The State further
claims that Mrs. Workman was motivated
to obstruct justice because she shared with
Kelly a joint account into which he deposited hundreds of dollars.
Mrs. Workman testified, and Kelly cor*
roborated that she handled each incident as
it came up. Rich time, she reprimanded
Kelly, Informed him of the rules of her
household and warned him not to do it
again. Kelly testified that he concealed his
abuse fiom the Workmaus. lu April 1988,
when the police informed Mrs. Woikman
that Kelly was under investigation, she
readily provided the police with whatever
evidence and information they requested.
In fact, it was Mrs. Workman who, at the
request of the police, searched her daughters' bedrooms, found the lingerie and the
photographs and turned them over to the
police, lloth Kelly and Mrs. Workman testified that the funds in the account were to
pay for skating lessons for E., that Mrs.
Workman never knew how much money
other for the commission of a cilinc did prolate the offender a meant for avoiding Jlscotciy or apprehension, obstruct by deception
anyone front pcifiMiiilitf an act thai might
lead to discovery, apprehension, prosecution
or conviction of a person, or conceal, alter or
destroy physical evidence.

GIM.MOH t. CUMMINCS
Cil«»a*« r i J 1*0J |tl«.ft Ari».

was in the account, and that she made only
one withdrawal of eighty five dollars. Finally, those Incidents occurred over a two
and a half year period, during which time
Mrs. Workman was Involved with the myriad tasks of running a household of thirteen
to fourteen |>eople plus guests.
We agree with the trial court that the
evidence is inherently Improbable such that
a reasonable mind could not conclude that
In 1986 and 1987 Mrs. Workman was aware
that Kelly was sexually exploiting E. and
that thereafter she hclj>cd him conceal the
ciiine until April 1988. Further, it Is Inherently improbable that, even if she were
aware of the abuse, the joint bank account
would have motivated Mrs. Workman to
conceal Kelly's abuse of her daughter. We
therefore find that the trial court was justified in arresting Judgment against Mra.
Workman because the facta proved did not
sup|K>rt the offense charged.
Affirmed.

Utah

|»l)

J 2f]

and conversion

11»e Third District Coui
Summit County. J. Dennis Frederick. J
granted summary judgment for dcfei
dauts, and appeal was taken. The Court r
Appeals, Greenwood, J.# held that trif
court improperly granted summary judj
ment prior to lime In which plaintiff wa
entitled to file rc*|mnse to defendants' mc
tinn to strike portions of his affidavit op
posing summary Judgment.
Reversed and remanded.

Judgment «-=»!8ft
Trial court Improperly granted summary judgment prior to time in which nonmuvant was entitled to file response to movants' motion to strike portion* of his affidavit opposing summary judgment. Judicial
Administration ftule 4-60l(IXb).

I). Gilbert Alhay (argued). Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant

I1ENCII and GREENWOOD,
concur.

w.

illlltlUM)

Druce A. Maak, Michael M. U t e r (argued), Salt U k e City, for defendants and
respondents Garlick, Pelton 4 Valley Rank.
I^owell V. Suminerhays. Murray, for defendants and rc*jH>ndciila Timber Uke.
Dennis M. Aatill, Salt U k e City, for defendant and respondent Valley Usuk.

Charles F. GIM.MOR, Jr., Plaintiff
and Appellant,
Velgh CUMAtlNCS. Jeffrey K. Garlick.
Janet E. Gnrllck, Peter Swauer. W. AlIan Pelton. Timber Lakes Corporation,
a Utah corporation. Valley Rank and
Trust Company as trustee for the W.
Allan Pelton Trust and for John Does 1
thtough 48, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 8905S2-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 22. 1991.

Iloundary dispute was brought, alleging, inter alia, unlawful detainer, trespass
uuhn.0 K» at* rzd-it
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Refore RENCII, II11 I INGS and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD. Judge:
Appellant Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (Gillmor) appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Jeffrey K. and
Janet K. Garlick (the Garlicka). and W.
Allan Pelton and Valley Rank and Trust
Company as trustee for the W. Allan Pelton Trust (Pelton). We conclude that the
summary judgment was granted prematurely because Gillmor was not given adequate time to res|>ond to appellees' motion
to strike portions of his affidavit opposing
summary ^ d g m e r . t . Therefore, we reverse.

. *

. t~r
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procedural

Error

Appellees' motion In strike parts of (Jill
inor's first affidavit wan based on Utah
It Civ P. f>ll(c). That rule provides that in a
Buininary judgment motion, "|s)opportiug
and opposing affidavits shall he made on
personal know ledge, shall set forth surh
farts as would he admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify lo the matters
staled therein." The motion to strike was
filetl simultaneously with, hut separately
from, appellees' reply memorandum supporting their underlying summary judgment motion.
Hecause appellees' Rule 00(c) ohjection to
Cillmor's fiist affidavit was framed as a
separate, written motion to strike, Cilhnor
should have been given ten days to respond, as prescrihed hy Utah Code .lod Admin. 4 501(1 )(h). Additionally, hecause the
motion was served on Cillinor hy mail.
Utah It Civ .P. 0(e) entitled him to an addi
tioual three days. Therefore, hecause the
motion to strike was served on January 12,
P.lM'.i, (lilhuor should have been given until
January 'IU to respond.
(lilhuor could have responded to the motion to strike hy supplementing his affidavit to meet Hole M'»(c) standards. Utah
It Civ.P. 60(e) (court may permit parly to
summary judgment motion to supplement
affidavits with depositions, answers to in
ier rogatories, or further affidavits). Hecause summary judgment is appropriate
only when it is clear lhat no disputed issues
of material fact exist, we believe that Cillinor should have been allowed to respond
to the motion in this fashion, and that the
trial court should have considered such a
1.

C l u *• * * T.14 I >Ut

response, If timely received, before ruling
• on the motion to strike and the summary
judgment motion. It was error, however,
to rule on the motions on January 111, six
days before Cillmor's lime to respond to
the motion to strike had expired.

We reverse because of procedural error,
and not on either issue tiilhnor argues on
appeal.' Theicfore, we do not address the
substantive issues Cilhnor presents.

ffli

IIOWCI L t. IIOWKI I.

HOC. i*Ac:ii ic: KF.POH ir.it. 2d sr.mr.s

Utah

Ahhongh flilhnor thJ nni Include pioccdoial
trior as a basis lor appeal tti his biict, he ilid
aigoe I he Issue before the trial com I. We consider the procedural Issue on aejtcal for pi.-»ellial reason*: wc are unable lu determine limit
the record bcfoie us uhal the com! ario.illy
considered hi gianting the suiuin.ny judgment

Cillmor's motion to reconsider, ami the
affiilavits filed with that motion, were filed
on January 2fi. 1981). Under the combined
operation of Utah Code Jud.Admin. 4~
COMIX") and Utah It Civ P. 0(e), these materials would have been timely if they had
been submitted ns a response to appellees'
motion lo strike, (lillmor's motion lo reconsider also directed the trial court's attention to the prematurity of the summary
judgment under Utile 4-001(1 Mb). At that
point, the trial court should have corrected
the procedural problem with its summary
judgment ruling by reconsidering that ruling in light of Cillmor's January 26 affidavits. However, the record does not reveal
whether the trial court denied the motion to
reconsider upon study of Cillmor's January
2f> affidavits or, in denying the motion lo
reconsider, disregarded those affidavits altogether.
Hecause the tiial court granted summary
judgment prematurely under the Applicable
procedural rules, and because nothing in
the record indicates that the court corrected its procedural error when that error was
called to its attention, the summary judgment is set aside. Set Giuco fishing &.
llcniol Tools, Inc. v. 11 on wood Exploration. Inc., 7:i5 P 2d 02, 02-0.1 (Utah l!»8r);
K.O. v. /Vinson, H 8 P 2d 088, 6'JI (Utah
Ct.App l!)B8). We reverse ami remand lo
the trial court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Fach party shall pay hit
or its own costs.
HENCII and HILLINGS, JJ., concur.
x l l l litIIH>

and driiying the motion for reconsideration.
Ibis Is simitar l«> those cases where wc remand
for findings because see are unable lo discern
from the record how the com I resolved material
Issues. Sc< Anon r. Miian.
M l V Id 996. 999
(UMh I9S7); State v. btvrpen. 79ft 1MJ 767,.
770-71 (Utah Cl A|.p 1990).
**

Walter Jiuite* IIONFLL. Plaintiff
nod Appellee,
v.
Iliuhara Joyce IIOWLI.L. Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890596-CA.
Couil of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 28, I99L
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as dale of separation, if one party has
acted obstiuctively.
3. Divorce «~237
Determining standard of living in order to set alimony after divorce is fact sensitive, subjective tusk and is not determined
by actuul expenses alone.
4. Divorce *--»M5
Trial courts have discretion to determine standard of living which existed during mariinge after consideration of relevant facts and equitable principles.

Divorce was sought. The Third Dis5. Divorce «^217
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Frank (].
Trial courts must consider the followM. Noel, J , granted divorce, awarded alimony,
ing factors in setting alimony afler divorce:
IlJ'itV mill divided property. Former wife appealJljjSs' tll- flie Court of Appeals, Crcenwood, J . , financial conditions and needs of recipient
spouse, recipient's ability to produce inl l T f e * n c ^ t n a l : U ) l , , : i ' court erroneously looked
fijjiS'S' *° preseparation standard of living in setcome, and ability of payor spouse lo pronMjii;'' ting alimony and should have considered
vide support.
fltfj/fiij; standard of living dining marriage up to
6. Divorce *^2tO(2,
rjjitime of trial approximately two years after
Trial court selling alimony after divorce should first determine financial needs
and resources of both parties and should
set alimony ns permitted by those parameters to approximate parties' standard of
ctil future tax consequences of propeity
living during marriage as closely as pnssi
jr. division pursuant to divorce.
Ide.
tvt/r
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
7. Divorce 4-210(2)
*;t<j: remanded.
If payor spouse's resources are adejl'|
Itciieh, J , concurred in part, dissented
quate, alimony following divorce need not
Y^ In part, and filed opinion.
be limited to provide for only tutsir needs,
but t hould also consider recipiml spouse's
station In life.

?

»!«]

Mai,

|Ul«S A , . r . | SSI I

7 1. Dlvoice 4-2.17
bj t
Alimony was erroneously based on preLliP) separation slamlard of living and should
|£J have been based on standard of living dur1- lug the marriage up lo lime of divorce tiial
:'ix about two years after separation; during
^ ; that two year period, husband's income
ji? doubled because another airline purchased
jll* husband's employer, ami husbands ability
|j/jj lo take advantage of lhat change in part
jKJIv resulted from perseverance during lean
'ItfirM. times.
i*mk>*- Ulvorce <^253(3)
' 111
Value of marital property is deter*
J. mined as of lime of divorce decree or at
r trial, but courts can, in exercise of their
>«, equitable powers, use different date, such

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8. Divorce 4^219
Trial court setting alimony after di
vorce must make findings on all matt rial
issues.
9. Divorce «=»2.19, 280(9)
Trial court's failure to make findings
on all issues material to setting alimony
after divorce constitutes reversible error,
unless pertinent facts in record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only finding in favor of judgment.
10. Divorce <t=>2IO(t)
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was
Inadequate to equalize abilities of former
wife and former husband to go forward

